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THE WORLD BANK AND AGRICULTURE

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE WORLD BANK’S WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008

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INTRODUCTION

Many have welcomed the 2008 World Development Report on Agriculture as a sign of the World Bank’s nascent interest in the profession of the world’s poorest. The World Bank has, however, long been involved in food and farming systems. This report provides a broad overview, together with some detailed case studies, of the precise impacts of the World Bank’s involvement with agriculture. The Bank’s policies, particularly those promoting structural adjustment (or their modern form – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), have been directly responsible for the current critical health of agriculture in developing countries. In the Bank’s view, the World Development Report offers a blueprint for the future of agriculture. Closer analysis, however, suggests that its recommendations will extend the crisis, not fix it.

I. The History of the World Bank’s Love and Hate of Agriculture

The World Bank’s initial forays into agriculture were diplomatic – they brokered, through the 1950s, a water-sharing arrangement between India and Pakistan over the Indus River Basin, a problem created by the partition of India after British rule. But the Bank was slow to start thinking systematically about agriculture. In 1961, across the World Bank’s central and field operations, the number of professionals charged with agriculture was twelve. There were structural reasons for the Bank’s disinclination towards agriculture. In its early years, it needed to prove its creditworthiness, which directed it towards projects in which a high rate of repayment was assured. Few agricultural programmes fit this brief.

The Bank shifted its vision with the arrival of a new president, George Woods, who noticed that agriculture, which employed two thirds of the world’s poorest people, accounted for only 8 percent of...
the Bank’s loans, to 1963. He inaugurated investment particularly in agricultural research, joining the initiatives driven by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations to develop ‘green revolution’ technology.

In the early 1970s, Bank President McNamara singled out agriculture, ‘which has for so long been the stepchild of development’, for particular focus. Through the 1970s, particularly in Africa, the Bank applied itself to building public institutions that could support farmers, through extension, credit and marketing. Paradoxically, it was precisely these marketing boards that the World Bank was to target and eradicate through the 1980s with its structural adjustment lending programme.

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were aimed at ‘getting the fundamentals right’ – an omnibus policy goal that encompassed a country’s government spending, exchange rate, tariff structure – in short every aspect of monetary and fiscal policy. For most governments in the Global South, such policies were non-negotiable. Many countries found themselves in a credit crunch following the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and had no way of servicing their debts without the World Bank. So they borrowed, and agreed to the conditions imposed by the Bank.

Among the aims of SAPs was the control of price inflation, which discouraged investment and saving, and was diagnosed as the product of profligate government expenditure. Government intervention was described as ‘distorting’ – a term that tacitly invokes an ideal of ‘undistorted’ markets. The framing of government intervention in this way marked the ascendance of a particular political ideology based on the economic doctrine of Milton Friedman. The solution to distortions was to set up the correct economic infrastructure so that prices reflected costs (so that the market might work more efficiently). This meant reductions in government social spending, as well as the dismantling of support mechanisms and agencies that had been created to assist the poor, and a simultaneous ‘opening’ of
markets to foreign capital, corporations, and imports. The result, detailed in country after country, was widespread unemployment, spikes in poverty rates, particularly for children, and, in some cases, food riots.\(^5\)

While these policies have been widely discredited by scholars of international development,\(^6\) they remain a core part of the Bank’s lending focus, whether under the banner of ‘adjustment with a human face’ or the more recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.\(^7\)

For agriculture, the effects of the SAPs were devastating. The two key impacts lay in:

- the liberalisation of trade and finance
- the dismantling of marketing boards

The following sections deal with each of these in turn.

### i) Liberalisation of trade and finance

Financial liberalisation is a central part of the macroeconomic changes instituted through structural adjustment lending. Invariably, the policies instituted by the Bank involved cutting the ties that governments had over their finances, particularly in the area of current account liberalisation, and exchange rate policy. ‘Getting prices right’ was the core reason behind structural adjustment – the structures that needed to be adjusted were those that had been deemed to distort prices. Government financial interventions, through the setting of exchange rates or the imposition of liquidity restrictions, were considered distorting. So they were removed. The adjustment invariably meant that the value of the local currency fell against the dollar – a particularly tough outcome for countries in the Global South, where the initial dollar-denominated

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\(^{5}\) Walton and Seddon 1984.

\(^{6}\) Stiglitz 2002 (Moore 2007).

\(^{7}\) Bracking 1999.
loans had been the occasion for the World Bank's overwhelming power to shape policy, and where it was correspondingly more difficult for countries to meet their debt service obligations. The perils of financial liberalisation, and its damaging impacts on states’ ability to coordinate development activities have recently been acknowledged by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Yet financial liberalisation remains a central part of the Bank’s approach to lending, with particularly harmful effects in agriculture.

Domestically, those farmers most able to benefit from liberalisation were those growing the appropriate commodities and possessing access to markets, credit, transportation and land. It gave the edge to export-oriented agriculture, but also to larger landholders, whose ranks have continued to grow throughout the developing world. This is in contrast to the ‘vast majority’ of farmers who, as the Bank itself admits,

… are smallholders, and an estimated 85 percent of them are farming less than two hectares. In countries as diverse as Bangladesh, China, Egypt, and Malawi, 95 percent of farms are smaller than two hectares, and in many other countries the great majority of farms is less than two hectares.9

CASE STUDY 1. Malawi averts famine by ignoring the bank.

In 2002-2003, market-oriented agricultural policy reforms were implemented (some say forced through Parliament) in Malawi as a precondition to release a new World Bank structural adjustment credit. These policies were criticised as pushing a liberalisation agenda at the expense of poor people’s food security. When another dry spell hit the country in early 2005, resulting in disastrous harvests, the country experienced its worst-ever food shortage. A UN appeal delivered food aid, but little fertilisers and seeds for the coming growing season. An ever-worsening crisis was predicted for the coming years.

The government responded by reversing some of the market-oriented policy reforms. A bold farm-subsidy programme was introduced, costing the government some $60 million, to pre-empt the impending famine, despite the initial opposition from donors, including the World Bank. The result of this intervention, which made inputs more affordable to smallholders, has been described as “spectacular”. Following the subsidy implementation and aided by favourable rains, maize harvests soared to 2.6 million metric tonnes, more than annual national requirement of 2.1 million metric tonnes. A famine was averted, and Malawi achieved a remarkable turnaround.

While it is true that the WDR provides a qualified endorsement of input subsidies to avert disasters, Malawi’s case suggests that input subsidies may have a longer-term role in situations where the conditions for effective markets are absent or in their infancy i.e. dilapidated transport infrastructure, lack of credit, or no effective private sector that can penetrate rural areas. Moreover, in situations of dire poverty and chronic food scarcity, it is arguable that fertiliser and seed ought to be treated as public goods that are better managed and regulated by a government dealing with the overall crisis.

Malawi’s case is also about country ownership and democratic governance. Faced with the dilemma over the reintroduction of the subsidies, Malawi’s cabinet involved Parliament in the discussions, which then appropriated the funding from the national budget. Fertiliser and seed traders, who were to be displaced by the subsidy, were consulted and involved in redesigning the allocation and implementation of the coupon-based subsidy system to mitigate impact. Civil society agitated in various constituencies, putting increased pressure on politicians to go ahead with the subsidies. Donors were initially sceptical, arguing that subsidies do not work. Because of the impressive results of the 2005-2006 subsidy programme, the UK’s DFID and Norway’s NORAD have now supported the 2006-2007 continuation of the programme. The local World Bank office has also agreed to provide technical support.

But the key challenge perhaps is for the Bank, particularly its lending operations, to open up its analytical frame. Experiences like Malawi’s demonstrate how realities on the ground should determine Bank policy, and not the other way around. 10

Financial liberalisation was part of a broader suite of policies which included central government reform, and trade liberalisation. This involves both the reduction of supports for farmers (discussed below) and the simultaneous reduction of tariff barriers. The net result is to expose farmers in different countries to increased cross-border competition. A central condition of trade liberalisation as a development strategy is the need for ‘a level playing field’, one in which producers in different markets compete not on terms of their government’s taxation or subsidy of agriculture, but on resource endowments and productivity. Unfortunately, this cardinal condition has never been fulfilled in international agriculture – as the World Bank itself notes in its latest World Development Report:

Low-income countries tend to impose relatively high taxes on farmers in the export sector as an important source of fiscal revenue, while developed countries tend to heavily subsidise farmers. More than 90 percent of the dollar value of agricultural support in OECD countries is provided by the European Union, which alone provides about half; Japan; the United States; and the Republic of Korea. In all four, the [level of support] remains high.  

This points to a more general challenge – that different economies have developed along different paths, and that what might be a fine policy for one might be counterproductive in another. As the economist Ha-Joon Chang has eloquently observed, developed countries arrived at their position in the world economy through judicious use of tariff barriers, infant industry support and government intervention. While Thomas Friedman in his ‘The Lexus and the Olive Tree’ celebrates the idea of the golden straitjacket – the set of policies that bind governments along lines shaped by the Bank- the Lexus itself wouldn’t have been possible without long and far-sighted government support of Toyota through the post-war period. Had Japan been wearing the golden straitjacket, its government would have been unable to support Toyota – and hence no Lexus.

A similar story can be told for agricultural policy. The contemporary giants of export agriculture, whether in the developed or developing world, without exception, developed their agriculture behind tariff walls, with subsidies for local processing and distribution industries. The Bank’s policies suggest that developing countries need to abjure precisely these policies; ones that worked demonstrably well for agricultural exporting countries. The net effect is to freeze the international economic asymmetry not only between developed and developing countries, but also between developing countries themselves. By precisely the same logic as the North-South divide, not all developing countries are on an economic level playing field – some have greater support for agriculture, and others less. With different factor endowments, and different levels of support, and on top of an un-level playing field, this market power is transferred to the most politically connected or economically empowered producers.

ii) Destruction of marketing boards.

A central target of Bank agricultural policy in the 1980s and 1990s were the agricultural marketing boards. These institutions were designed to ensure price stability for farmers, sometimes as part of a national strategy to guarantee local food supplies, as well as providing direct, and socially acceptable, support to rural areas. These boards typically purchased commodities from farmers at a price fixed high enough to cover the costs of production plus a profit. While these institutions often served their purpose, they came under attack with the Bank’s new lending priorities in the 1980s, for being wasteful of resources, and for providing the wrong market signals for farmers. There lies in this an irony that the Bank’s own historians have observed:

“during the 1970s, especially in Africa, the Bank put a good deal of thought as well as lending muscle into the development and support of a variety of agricultural marketing and processing parastals. Yet in the 1980s it encouraged the dismantling of the same parastals.”  

10 World Bank 2007: 133-134.
An import surge can be defined as a shock to the domestic market caused by sudden influx of large volumes of imports at depressed prices with a damaging effect on the competing domestic sector. An FAO study, which covered 23 food groups in 102 developing countries from 1980 to 2003, documents an astounding frequency of import surges - between 7,132 to 12,167, depending upon the method of calculation. So widespread is this phenomena that the list of its occurrences is almost unending. Import surges have occurred in dairy, maize and sugar in Kenya; rice, poultry and tomato paste in Ghana; poultry, rice and vegetable oils in Cameroon; onions and tobacco in the Philippines; rice and soya in Indonesia; maize, sugar and milk in Malawi; oilseeds in Mozambique; rice, dairy and maize in Tanzania; dairy, poultry and onions in Jamaica; oilseeds in India; onions, potatoes and dairy in Sri Lanka; tomato paste in Senegal; soya beans and cotton in Mexico; rice and poultry in the Gambia; and rice in Haiti.

Import surges can wipe out agricultural jobs in domestic sectors, such as in Kenya’s local sugar industry. Farm jobs have been lost, agro-processing industries have closed down, indebtedness of farmers has increased. Since alternative employment in services or in the industrial sector is often not readily available, and certainly not in such large numbers, loss of employment in agriculture is often tantamount to increased poverty, food insecurity, and also to the loss of access to essential services, such as education and healthcare.

Bank-advised policies, such as unilateral liberalisation and abolition of parastatal companies, have left many countries extremely vulnerable to import surges. In the case of Ghana, tariffs were reduced from 100 percent to 20 percent in 1992 and in effect, the imports of rice rose by 200 percent. In 2003, when government decided to raise the tariffs on rice import from 20 to 25 percent, it failed due to pressure from the Bank’s sister organisation, the IMF. In the case of Gambia, the forced privatisation of the Gambian Produce Marketing Board (GPMB) under the Economic Recovery Programme of 1985, has led to the dramatic increase in rice imports from 38,000 tonnes in 1986 to 101,600 tonnes in 2004. The rice import surges occurred when the government followed the Bank’s advice to liberalise its commodities markets, which were vital for local food security.

Yet the Bank has not learnt any lesson from its past policy mistakes. In the present round of the Doha trade negotiations, the Bank has issued a paper on “Special Products” in which it continues to push developing countries towards further liberalisation, ignoring their right to protect agricultural commodities that are vital for food security, livelihoods and rural development needs. The Bank remained very critical of Indonesia’s rice import policy while the country, as the leader of developing countries under the WTO, favoured the protection of key agricultural products. Following the Bank’s advice, Indonesia abolished the BULOG, its state trading enterprise, eliminating its role in price setting, credit subsidy, off-budget fund and access to subsidised exchange rates. After suffering rice import surges in 1997, 1998 and 2000, not only has the nation raised its tariffs but it has also put in place quantitative restriction on imports of rice. After a period of rapid deregulation, the import of sensitive commodities such as rice, sugar and soybean has been put back under BULOG’s control.

In late 2006, the Bank criticised the Indonesian government stating that its rice pricing policy had increased the number of poor in the country. It advised the government to immediately privatise the BULOG. This advice was rejected by Indonesia because the Bank had used weekly data to make a full-year calculation, giving a misleading impression that a production deficit was likely to happen all year long. In addition, the Bank’s report has been silent on the role of rice in non-food services i.e. its role in economic stability, income distribution and job creation. The Bank has also ignored the fact that price is but one economic incentive, ignoring non-price incentives.

When the price of rice goes down during a period of high import surges, the numbers of poor people does not decline significantly. Instead, local food production decreases the following year and more people are pushed out of agricultural jobs. Eventually, local food production capacity is destroyed. In such a situation, the availability of cheap, subsidised imports provides no solution to people who have lost their livelihoods.

II. The State of the World’s Agriculture

The World Bank’s influence on agriculture since the 1980s has meant that government spending on agriculture has fallen in line with the Bank’s own aversion to supporting agriculture. At the end of Bank President McNamara’s tenure, at the beginning of the 1980s, Bank spending on agriculture was US$5.4 billion (in constant 1992 dollars). By the beginning of the 1990s, the figure was nearer US$3.9 billion. Since spending priorities for governments were largely shaped by the Bank’s own agenda, this fall is mirrored in a widespread fall, across a range of developing countries, in the budget for government spending on agriculture, as compared with other government expenditure. The global levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) destined for agriculture have been falling steadily throughout the 1990’s, from US$6.7 billion in 1984 to US$2.7 billion in 2002. The consequences of this are profound. Today, as the Bank again observes, in agriculture-based countries,

… agriculture accounted for about a third of overall growth over 1993–2005. More than half a billion people live in these countries, 49 percent of them on less than $1 a day and 68 percent of them in rural areas.

Rural poverty has a vast human cost. As a result of malnutrition, nearly 6 million children under five will die in the next 12 months. These deaths are at one end of a continuum of costs associated with malnutrition, hunger and preventable disease; and they are all tightly associated with one another. Yet there is much potential in agriculture. The Bank itself notes that:

an increase in overall GDP coming from agricultural labor productivity is on average 2.9 times more effective in raising the incomes of the poorest quintile in developing countries and 2.5 times more effective for countries in Latin America than an equivalent increase in GDP coming from non-agricultural labour productivity.

The fact that the Bank has been so reluctant to invest in agriculture as opposed to non-agricultural projects, even in light of these statistics, is a measure of the extent to which Bank policy has been, and continues to be, doctrinal rather than evidence based. These development doctrines blind the Bank, and push it toward policies that are based less on evidence and more on a particular and unreconstructed vision of how markets should work. Nowhere does the Bank actually admit its complicity in the parlous state of developing country agriculture. This is an irony for an institution that advances the cause of ‘accountability’. As the examination of its current report’s policies shows, the Bank is structurally and politically unable to accommodate any sort of meaningful accountability for its actions, and it is to the Bank’s current recommendations that we now turn.
i) Agricultural Markets – Consolidating and Expanding Agribusiness Power

One of the most original and fundamental empirical results in development economics was produced by the economist Amartya Sen. He observed that in every major famine since the Second World War, there has always been sufficient food in the market to feed the hungry. The reason that people have starved is not because of a shortage of food, but because of people’s inability to buy it. Those who were able to purchase large amounts of grain did so – and then hoarded it, speculating that the price would rise. The cost of this speculation was the deaths of those unable to pay the higher price. In other words, the market was operating exactly as it ought, but failed to provide for the poor, because of the position in the market of comparatively large buyers and sellers who shaped that market, and made it impossible for those without rights or entitlements to eat. This is an insight that has failed to translate into the Bank’s thinking. In Chapter 5 of the World Development Report, the Bank enthuses over the possibilities of unfettered and free markets, with special praise reserved for those countries that have adopted neoliberal economic principles (such as Bangladesh).

While keen to pursue an agenda consonant with the theory of free markets, the Bank is not unaware that agricultural markets are characterised by oligopoly. They make explicit note of this, observing that:

Supermarkets control 60 to 70 percent of food sales in Argentina and Brazil, and are expanding rapidly in China, India, and urban Africa. Though these trends in agribusiness consolidation have been going on for years in industrial countries, they are now becoming common in developing countries as well.

They observe that there has been increased concentration within all major food and agribusiness sectors, and that the CR4 ratios, the ratio of any given market controlled by its four largest corporations, have consistently been increasing. The concentration of power in the food system is directly related to trade and financial liberalisation. The depreciation of a developing country’s currency allows foreign companies with dollar denominated funds to snap up local processing concerns at fire-sale prices. With the lifting of barriers of national ownership and technology transfer, large corporations are able to buy large segments of the domestic market in developing countries. The Bank’s justification has been that these markets allow for the efficient allocation of resources. That assumption only holds, however, in the absence of a distorted market, and trade liberalisation is a policy that has directly led to the concentration of power in the market.

The principle winners from this state of affairs are the largest companies. The results of concentration have been striking:

- the top 30 food retailing corporations account for one-third of global grocery sales
- one TNC controls 80 percent of Peru’s milk production
- five companies control 90 percent of the world grain trade
- six corporations control three-quarters of the global pesticides market.

These outcomes, while extreme, are indicative of the concentration of power in the food system. It is an outcome about which the Bank is occasionally ambivalent, but which it also seems to believe is benign. Indeed, they offer advice to agribusiness in extracting value from their workforce:

Agriculture by nature makes supervising contracts difficult. Without significant monitoring, it is difficult to observe labour effort or to infer effort from observed output. To overcome this agency problem, various contractual arrangements arise to create

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16 Sen 1981.
17 World Bank 2007: 171. But even this is tenuous – the case the Bank presents is that, in a time of crop failure, the government mitigated price variability by letting private traders import grain, rather than the government buying it, and selling it at subsidized rates. Yet this begs the question – why was the Bangladeshi government unable to find the resources necessary to feed its people? Further, the private traders who imported rice did not sell below cost price. So how did the poorest, normally dependent on subsidized government shops, afford to buy rice?
19 Heffernan 2000 provides the definitive guide to this.
appropriate work incentives for laborers. One is to offer piece-rate wages rather than daily wages for harvest tasks. Research has shown that workers do supply more effort under piece-rate schemes than when working for daily wages.\textsuperscript{21}

While advocating tougher labour contracts for agricultural workers, the Bank fills out a broader policy strategy in favour of large agribusinesses. In order to justify this, some fairly dogmatic assertions are provided that while such developments are underway, they will be poverty neutral and benign. For example:

\textit{Fresh fruits and vegetables generally account for the lowest share in supermarket sales, and small shops and wet markets will likely remain important marketing channels for these products for years to come.}\textsuperscript{22}

The evidence from a range of country studies, some of which are cited by the report's authors, doesn’t substantiate this assertion.\textsuperscript{23} While the call to ‘address bottlenecks’\textsuperscript{24} might point to the Bank’s acknowledgement that the bottleneck of agribusinesses in the global economy is one that needs to be actively fought, the Bank is advocating something rather different. It sees the bottleneck not as a problem of concentrated market power, but as a problem of “barriers to entry” for small and medium sized agribusinesses. Again, this ignores the market and political power of the large players in the market not only to play by the rules, but to break them. Insofar as the exploitative behaviour of these multinationals is concerned, the Bank offers ‘corporate social responsibility’ as a way forward, repurposing press releases from Danone, TetraPak, and Mars Inc into official development policy.\textsuperscript{25} Studies conducted by ActionAid give the lie to the Bank’s benign assessment of the concentration of power in the market system, as the box on cashew processing demonstrates.

Again, the impacts of this have a pronounced gender bias. Agroindustry tends to code female tasks as unskilled, with women employed for labour intensive tasks while men are preferred for tasks involving machinery, and are generally given preference in the distribution of full time and supervisory roles. As a result of this systematic discrimination, women earn less than men and are more likely to be paid

at piece rate, following the Bank’s advice.\textsuperscript{26} It is important to be clear here that women’s exploitation is linked directly to trade liberalisation and associated policies imposed by the World Bank, across a range of sectors.\textsuperscript{27} Women in agriculture, being the poorest, suffer more than their urban counterparts. The effects of patriarchy are magnified by the Bank through its household level analysis, which pays scant attention to the issues of division of labour and power within households, and which therefore involves burdens placed on the household being disproportionately borne by women.

**Six Reasons To Regulate Transnational Corporations in the Global Food System**

- TNCs use and abuse their market power to drain wealth from poor communities
- TNCs pay low prices and capture the resulting value
- TNCs marginalise poor farmers and rural workers
- TNCs are not fully accountable for their impacts on human rights and the environment
- Corporate social responsibility is optional and insufficient
- People harmed by corporate activity are denied access to justice

Source: ActionAid International 2005

**Case Study 3. Who Gets What? The Cashew Split.**

Mercy greets the news with a look of stunned disbelief – “That’s more than I get for three weeks’ work”, she says on discovering that the kilo of cashew nuts, which she has been paid 5p to shell will retail for £9 or more in a UK supermarket. The news is all the more shocking because of what the cashew factory job in Tamil Nadu’s Kanyakumari district is doing to Mercy’s health: “I get pains in my knees from squatting all day. ... I get headaches, I get dizziness and vomiting from breathing in the smoke [caused by the cashew roasting process].” Mercy is one of an estimated 500,000 women who process cashews for a living in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and of two million people employed by the cashew industry across India, the world’s biggest exporter of shelled cashews. New evidence shows that for every pound shoppers spend on cashews in British supermarkets just one penny, and sometimes only half a penny, goes to the women workers who process the nuts. (Another 22p is shared between farmers, traders and processing companies and exporters in India.)

**WHO Gets What? The Cashew Split.**

*Share of UK supermarket retail price.*

- Supermarket 45 percent
- Roaster/salter company 20 percent
- UK importer 12 percent
- Transport (in India) 2 percent
- Processing company 5 percent
- Producer 15 percent
- Processing worker 1 percent

This has profoundly gendered impacts. Women are preferred by food processing concerns, on the grounds that they can be paid less. In order to make ends meet, women have long working hours, which adds to women’s triple burden in terms of paid work, domestic work such as childcare, and work in the community.

The organisations that benefit from this, however, do rather well. Competition from lower cost, less reputable private processing operations in India’s liberalised cashew market has helped push most government factories out of business, while those still operating are only able to open their gates to workers for as little as 30 days a year. UK importers say that the lower prices and higher costs imposed by supermarket buyers are forcing them to source cashews from these cheaper producers in India.

Source: ActionAid International, Hearson and Eagleton 2007

\textsuperscript{26} Lastarria-Cornhiel 2006. \textsuperscript{27} Hale 1999 and Balakrishnan 2002.
III. THE BANK AND AGRARIAN REFORM: CONSOLIDATING THE LAND IN THE HANDS OF FEW?

The Bank’s gender myopia can also be found in its approach to land reform. The Bank’s report goes out of its way, on several occasions, to observe that

*The agriculture for development] agenda must recognize the often-dominant role of women as farmers, agroprocessors, and traders in local markets.*

In pointing to the invariably unequal burden that women living and working in agriculture bear, the report prompts thinking about how policy needs, centrally, to advance and protect, rather than exploit, women. Its actual policy suggestions, however, fall rather flat on this front. The Bank suggests that the key to remedying this is to introduce property rights for women. While it is true that legal discrimination continues to affect women, and prejudice their chances of development, there is a great deal of work that remains after women win *de jure* rights to land. As Sofia Monsalve argues, to accord individual property rights to women is often merely the finishing touch in a bigger economic project that destroys the possibilities of smallholder agriculture, and renders the right to land useless. Property rights can too easily be used as, to use Monsalve’s phrase, neoliberalism’s Trojan Horse.

These property rights have formed a central plank in the Bank’s agricultural reform programme. It is particularly keen to promote property rights as a gender-empowering policy. While it is clearly important for women to be able to own land, the possibility of ownership as a stand-alone policy does very little to address the deeper causes and institutions of patriarchy. This is something that the Bank itself admits:

*Until a recent law change, a woman in Nepal could not inherit land from her parents. In Malawi widows can lose their land from land grabbing by the husband’s family. Women’s land rights under customary tenure regimes are also much weaker than men’s. Evidence from Ghana suggests that shifts to individual ownership in such contexts can sometimes strengthen women’s land rights. Yet in other cases, titling programs, by conferring titles to the male household head, contribute to the breakdown of customary systems that helped guarantee married women’s access to land.*

The Bank’s ambivalence about land reform – drawn to it as a policy, but unable to categorically prove it as the *sine qua non* of agricultural change, is echoed in its other thoughts on land reform. Consider, for instance, how gendered inequality in access to capital sits alongside the Bank’s assertion that

*Secure and unambiguous property rights also allow markets to transfer land to more productive uses and users.*

Recent studies have shown the dangers of a slavish approach to property rights. A study in Ghana found that women landowners were less productive than men, but that this had little to do with any innate physical difference, and much more to do with the fact that women were keeping their land fallow for a far briefer period than men, thus reducing soil fertility. The reason women were reluctant to leave their land fallow was because they were concerned that doing so would endanger their effective rights over the land. So they worked the land, knowing that they’d get less out than their male counterparts, rather than risk losing the land through having it taken over. The causal relation here is that political and social power increases the security of one’s property rights. A simple prescription of property rights will, therefore, militate against ‘development’ unless prior work is done to address deeper concerns over power and human rights. If the Bank prescription were to be followed in this case, land would be transferred away from ‘less productive’ women to ‘more productive uses and users’ – the more powerful men.

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29 Monsalve 2006.
32 Goldstein and Udry 2006.
The Bank’s market monomania frequently takes
off from entirely correct observations, such as
those around women’s lack of effective control
over resources, and arrive in policy territory that is
largely unwarranted. Indeed, the Bank proposes
analyses and policies that fly in the face both of
these observations, and of the historical record
in terms of best practice. The Bank should have
slightly greater difficulty in pointing to success
stories of market-led land reform than it does. It
offers South Africa and Brazil as two cases where
such reform has worked wonders, arguing that

*lessons must be derived from these
pioneering experiences for potential
wider application.*

Unfortunately, the Bank is only able to represent
these as successes by misrepresenting the results
of the reform. It is widely acknowledged in South
Africa that the land reform programme has been
a disaster. The Bank is not above distorting the
reporting of this, such as its assertion that:

In Brazil and South Africa, rural non-
contributory pension funds protect the
aged, facilitate earlier land transfers to
the younger generation, and relieve those
who work from the financial burden of
supporting the elderly.

In fact, since the end of Apartheid, South Africa’s
human development levels have fallen – from an
HDI in 1995 of 0.741 to a 2004 level of 0.653. The
existence of the social security system has
dulled the impacts of economic policy in terms of
malnutrition and poverty, but it is a something of
a stretch to say that it has facilitated land transfers
to the younger generation. Since the end of
apartheid, only 6 percent of the land has changed
hands. And the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’
approaches subsidised by the Bank are showing
signs of implosion with the end of subsidy.

There are similar misrepresentations when the
Bank praises Brazil’s land policy. The Brazilian
public intellectual Sérgio Sauer points to the
bigger picture in Brazil’s land holdings:

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33 World Bank 2007: 12.
34 See, e.g. Hall 2004.
36 UNDP 2001 and other years.
37 Duflo 2003.
38 Ben Cousins, Personal communication.
…in 1970, farms smaller than 100 hectares accounted for 90.8 percent of total farms, covering 23.5 percent of the area. In the 1996 census, the share of the number of small farms had dropped to 89.3 percent, and their area to 20 percent of the total. On the other hand, only 0.7 percent of landholdings in 1970 were over 1,000 hectares in size, covering 39.5 percent of the total area. By 1996, these latter figures had evolved to 1 percent of total farms, and 45 percent of the area.\(^\text{39}\)

In this context, the Bank has adopted a ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’ approach to land reform, providing credit for poor people to enter the land market, in a programme called Cédula da Terra. Although the beneficiaries of the programme are understandably happier owning property than not owning, there have been some serious problems. Again, as Sauer notes,

… even seeing the Cédula as the only option… many interviewees voiced negative opinions regarding their situation on the new land in several areas. Many even stated that they now face greater hardships than they had in the past. Unkept promises, particularly when funds are not released for production or for infrastructure, were among the most common reasons for this generalised discontent.\(^\text{40}\)

Further, a survey of a number of Cédula da Terra households revealed that families have had little or no influence over decisions, such as choice of farms, or in the negotiating process, such as setting the price of land. Most of the negotiations are done by the government officials in charge, a clear challenge to market-based logic, who ultimately set the course of any deal, based on their knowledge of the funding limits (and, at times, their personal relations with the seller).\(^\text{41}\) … While willing to pay, interviewees were unanimous in stating that they would not be able to comply with their commitment to make the first installment. This inability to make any kind of payment was recurrent in all interviews, leaving no doubt as to the precarious situation in the areas surveyed.\(^\text{42}\)

Both the Bank and its critics observe that agrarian reform requires a comprehensive approach, but they differ on the specific contours of that reform. The Bank’s experience in Brazil shows that that while effective control of land is of central importance to the rural poor, the private parcelling out of land in a ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’ market is not the way to make sure that control is exercised. Ample historical evidence exists to point to an alternative.\(^\text{43}\) The Bank also provides evidence to suggest that simple property ownership is insufficient, and sometimes simply isn’t chosen:

\begin{quote}
In Mexico certified individual land plots in ejido communities can become fully transferable freehold land through a qualified vote by the assembly. But the fact that fewer than 15 percent of ejidos chose full titling shows that many users see the benefits of maintaining communal relations to be greater than those from individualization of rights.\(^\text{44}\)
\end{quote}

The Bank admits the need for broader policies. But instead of those policies following a well-proven and successful path of state-led land reform – a path that the Bank acknowledges as key to the ongoing economic success of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan,\(^\text{45}\) the Bank is keen to turn its back on the lessons of history, let markets loose, distort the reporting concerning the success of these experiments, and offer instead to remedy this by siphoning rural people out of agriculture completely.

This is perhaps the most controversial recommendation in the WDR. The Bank takes the view that smallholder agriculture is not an economically viable activity. This is evinced by the market’s tendency to move land from the hands of poor farmers to richer ones, leading to the current situation where the majority of export agriculture is carried out on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Sauer 2006: 178. See also Barros, Sauer and Schwartzman 2003.
\item Sauer 2006: 184.
\item Sauer 2006: 185.
\item Sauer 2006: 189.
\item Borras 2007.
\item World Bank 2007: 195.
\item World Bank 2007: 200.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
a few large farms while the majority of poor farmers live on relatively small plots. The Bank suggests that this land concentration is a sign that land is being transferred to ‘more efficient’ farmers – with the concomitant recommendation that the rural poor should be helped to leave agriculture and switch to non-agricultural labour. That smallholder agriculture has, for the first time in human history, ceased to be a viable economic activity, has much to do with the policies instituted by the Bank.

Yet the emptying of the countryside is now the only option that the Bank can see to solve the problem of agriculture and development. In reality, this policy offers economic cover for the political expropriation of the rural poor. Nowhere is this clearer than Colombia – where the countryside has been emptied through political violence, smallholders expropriated, and large landowners able to take over land through a process which commentator Hector Mondragón calls ‘fake agrarian reform’. And while WDR laments what has happened in Columbia, the Bank’s policy is explicitly aimed at removing the poorest people from agriculture, a policy that has been called ‘depeasantisation’. These rural workers, already disenfranchised from property, are cast off under this policy, to face uncertain futures either in the rural non-agricultural employment market, or in the swelling shanty towns of the cities. It is a policy that makes might right in rural areas and, again, shrugs off evidence suggesting that comprehensive agrarian reform, as demanded by the world’s poorest farmers, can offer alternatives within agriculture.

The policies for comprehensive and progressive (as opposed to ‘fake’) agrarian reform already exist, within a number of international forums. The International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) has produced a number of recommendations under the umbrella of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. There are also successful examples of land tenure reform that do not capitulate to the blanket enforcement of individual property rights, but which instead turn to negotiated territorial development approaches, which can reduce the number of land related conflicts by embracing negotiation with communities, rather than relying on the omniscience of the market. These approaches aren’t, however, on the cards dealt by the Bank. Rather than promote progressive social policy to achieve change, the Bank draws on a tradition that stretches back to the Cold War, of using agricultural technology to paper over the predations of rural poverty. It is to these technologies that we now turn.

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Case Study 4. The Rural Labour Market, Land concentration and its effects on landlessness in India.

As part of a neoliberal policy package in India, rural workers find themselves increasingly working outside agriculture. But while the non-agriculture sector has absorbed some of the people made landless, this increase, along with the one provided by the route of education, is not enough to compensate for the increasing number of under- and unemployeed in rural areas. The upshot is that while some agricultural labourers seek refuge in other sectors, those who remain in the smaller agricultural labour pool continue to struggle, with stiffer competition for wage days, and of course high levels of poverty. The effects of land markets can be seen in the soaring rates of landless households, up from around 35 percent in 1987–88 to as much as 41 percent in 1999–2000. The landless and those living in marginal land account for 63 per cent of rural households, up from 55 per cent in 1987–88. This, over a period in which operational holdings were subject to a significant degree of concentration: many small and marginal peasants lost land during this period and were pushed off their land and into wage labour through the market.

Source: Ghosh 2003

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46 Mondragón 2006.
47 Araghi 1995.
48 Available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4507e/y4507e09.htm
49 Perkins 1997.
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND BLAME SHIFTING

In the WDR chapter on science and technology, rather than dwell on a past in which they are uncomfortably complicit, the report’s authors are keen to point to the future. In that future, the Bank believes, new agricultural technology will improve conditions for the poor. The Bank observes that from an ecological perspective, such improvement is exceedingly desirable:

In the Indian subcontinent, groundwater withdrawals have surged from less than 20 cubic kilometers to more than 250 cubic kilometers per year since the 1950s.50

Yet they neglect to mention that the reason that groundwater extraction rates have soared is precisely a twenty-year-old technological innovation – the Green Revolution. The Bank is keen not to indict, but to replicate, the Green Revolution. In the future, the second Green Revolution will have a strong reliance on genetically modified (GM) crops. The Bank presents findings from India, China and South Africa, among other places, to support these conclusions. Yet the Bank’s superficial treatment of GM crop’s possibilities lead it to ignore the experience of GM cotton farmers in India, where indebtedness associated with the purchase of GM seed licenses has led to soaring rates of suicide following crop failure, and a subsequent ban by Andhra Pradesh for two varieties of GM cotton.51 In its representation of South African success with GM cotton, the report cites approvingly an older study showing high rates of return and adoption, but hidden in the sources, qualifies this with more recent studies, showing that, rather than unparalleled success, smallholder farmers in KwaZulu-Natal have been exposed to, in the words of one commentator, and ‘institutional failure’.52

Again, part of this institutional failure has been authored by the World Bank. In its insistence on promoting intellectual property rights regulations in partnership with the World Trade Organisation, the Bank has prejudiced the efforts of local plant-breeders, whose considerable experience and generations of breeding has been the subject of ‘biopiracy’.53 Indeed, the Bank itself notes the prejudicial effects of IPRs for developing country farmers:

50 World Bank 2007: 257.
51 Devraj 2005.
52 Gouse et al. 2005. For a more systematic critique, see Witt, Patel and Schnurr 2006.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have partially overcome these market failures in industrial countries, but few technologies of importance to poor farmers can be cost-effectively protected by IPRs.\textsuperscript{54}

It is, however, unwilling to follow the logic of its own argument, and push for publically funded, supported and accountable research rather than for private innovation in agricultural research funded by IPRs. Under structural adjustment programmes, the institutions that would have been able to carry out agricultural research that was people-centred and environmentally sustainable, such as extension departments associated with Ministries of Agriculture, or universities, have been gutted by the Bank’s own austerity programmes. The Bank’s involvement in the demise of these kinds of research institution doesn’t enter into its otherwise general lament over the paucity of such research in developing countries, particularly in Africa.

Science and technology works best for poor, marginalised and indigenous communities when it is affordable, participatory, locally-adapted, site-specific, gender sensitive and strengthens local biodiversity and builds on farmers’ knowledge. Current and future generations of GM technology meet none of these requirements. And yet pro-poor science and technology is already enjoying success in the fields, as Miguel Altieri, one of the most dedicated proponents of agroecology in Latin America, shows.\textsuperscript{55} Rather than focus on the monocultures of industrial agriculture, agroecology works with complex farming systems designed for local microenvironments, and agroecology in Latin America has been shown to be associated with community empowerment, improved soil fertility, and increases in biodiversity.

It is important here to situate technological interventions in social context, for technology is never socially neutral. The history of the Green Revolution, emerging as it did from the crucible of Cold War politics, shows the complex intertwining of states, science, and social control. As Perkins argues, the role of yield-enhancing crops was explicitly understood to tamp down political pressures for change, particularly around land reform.\textsuperscript{56} The Green Revolution was of a piece with a particular kind of rural power structure. The ‘New Green Revolution’ also has accompanying technologies of governance, and it is to these that we now turn.
V. STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE OR PRIVATISING DEMOCRACY?

Because the way the Bank can exercise control over developing country economies is fundamentally unilateral, the Bank has come under criticism for its lack of accountability. It has responded with a comprehensive rebranding of its policies, accompanied by an insistence that governments and local civil society ‘own’ the Bank’s policies. This shift is demonstrated through the change in name and emphasis of its Structural Adjustment Policies into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). With many of the key economic policies preserved from the previous incarnation, the new PRSPs distinguish themselves through a strong insistence on ‘getting institutions right’, along with ‘getting prices right’. This institutional emphasis makes it possible for the Bank to engage in a far more sophisticated way with domestic politics in developing countries. (See Case Study 5).

In Chapter 11 of the report, the Bank details the changes in governance that it thinks should happen. This includes general encouragement for governments to be ‘more responsive’ to the needs of its rural citizens. This is, once again, ironic given that governments were more responsive until the Bank demanded that they cut back their spending. The report also calls for increased participation from civil society and the private sector. This call stems from a particular diagnosis of the failures of structural adjustment. In the aftermath of its structural adjustment policies, the WDR observes that the private sector involvement that they expected didn’t quite appear. They termed these problems ‘second generation problems’, and they explain the parlous state of rural economies in this way:

The weaknesses and lack of credibility of public institutions to enforce appropriate rules of behavior for the private sector is part of it. Public intervention in grades and standards and in contract enforcement is essential to ensure that private markets work. Insufficient attention to these political economy and governance challenges was a major reason why several key recommendations of the 1982 World Development Report on agriculture were not fully implemented, particularly those for trade liberalization, increased investments in infrastructure and R&D in Africa, and better delivery of health and education services to rural populations.

This opens the door to the Bank’s new shift in focus away from its, and the private sector’s, complicity in the state of affairs, towards a new policy area: governance. Again, the Bank is clear about the role of governments – in their view the state should be in the business of correcting market failure, and regulating competition. But since its capacities have been so denuded by structural adjustment

Case Study 5: Jubilee South Pan-African declaration on PRSPs

- The PRSPs are not based on real peoples participation and ownership, or decision-making. To the contrary, there is no intention of taking civil society perspectives seriously; but to keep participation to mere public relations legitimisation;
- The lack of genuine commitment to participation is further manifested in the failure to provide full and timely access to all necessary information, limiting the capacity of civil society to make meaningful contributions.
- The PRSPs have been introduced according to pre-set external schedules which in most countries have resulted in an altogether inadequate time period for an effective participatory process.
- In addition to all the constraints placed on governments and civil society organisations in formulating PRSPs, the World Bank and IMF retain the right to veto the final programmes. This reflects the ultimate mockery of the threadbare claim that the PRSPs are based on ‘national ownership’.
- An additional serious concern is the way in which PRSPs are being used by the World Bank and IMF, both directly and indirectly, to co-opt NGOs to ‘monitor’ their own governments on behalf of these institutions.

Source: Jubilee South 2001
policies, what once lay exclusively in the public domain will now shift towards the private:

_The state will need greater capacity to coordinate across sectors and to form partnerships with private and civil society actors._60

The Bank encourages ministries of agriculture to form alliances with agribusiness, and also suggests that corporate social responsibility is one force that can substitute for state’s inability to provide. Again, the reliance in this assertion on the public relations material from the private sector suggests that the Bank’s policy is rather more dependent on wishful thinking than on data. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the few examples of corporate social responsibility are systematically outweighed by widespread corporate social irresponsibility.61

Despite this, the Bank is keen to push forward with an agenda that not only entrenches its structural adjustment programmes’ deleterious effects on democracy, but pushes democracy into the private sector. One programme it quotes of approvingly is that the NGO “Global Voices uses information and communication technology (ICT) to engage thousands of citizens in townhall meetings to deliberate specific policies.”62 Of course, the point here isn’t that citizens should not be allowed access to technology to be able to participate in democracy. It’s that the state has such little capacity for basic levels of democracy that it is forced to outsource it.

A number of critics of the Bank’s governance platform have observed that the Bank has long been pushing for privatisation as a general policy of principle, and some of the more astute have observed that with the creep of neoliberalism, and its disordering effects, there is a need for order. ‘Governance’ fills this role all too well, and provides the motivation behind the Bank’s call to increase the ambit of its power in agriculture. As part of its agriculture for development agenda, the Bank is pushing for an overhaul of international institutions involved in agriculture, because of their participation in rural poverty.

_With their narrow sectoral focus, the global institutions created for agriculture in the 20th century, despite their many achievements, are inadequately prepared to address today’s interrelated and multisectoral agendas. Institutional reforms and innovations are needed to facilitate greater coordination across international agencies and with the new actors in the global arena, including civil society, the business sector, and philanthropy._63

In terms of international reform, the Bank offers the following observation about its sister organisation, the United Nations:

_The need to reform global institutions is widely recognized, and various reform options are on the table, ranging from management and operational reforms to improve the efficiency of UN agencies, including the FAO, to consolidating the many UN agencies into just three—one for development, one for humanitarian affairs, and one for the environment._64

This overhaul of international governance is more than a power-play by the Bank. It is rendered both possible and necessary only after the dismantling of the possibility of democracy in the developing world.65 At no point is any reform suggested for the Bank itself. Indeed, the Bank is the one institution that emerges unstained from its analysis – but only because the Bank’s own policies were never under the microscope to begin with.

Yet for millions of farmers and farmworkers, the Bank’s policies are the subject of everyday struggle, and peasant and landless movements in the Global South have offered a powerful set of policy alternatives to the Bank’s agricultural prescriptions.

60 World Bank 2007: 2.
61 ActionAid International 2005.
64 World Bank 2007: 23.
65 Bernstein 2007.
They have been formulated not through ‘expert’ panels, but through almost a decade of democratic consultation with, and ownership by, the world's poorest farmers and workers. A major alternative set of policies, which depends on democracy (and not technocracy) for its success has been forged by the international peasant movement, La Via Campesina. This approach, known as ‘food sovereignty’, offers a profound alternative based on rights, in particular the right of communities and nations to make informed choices about their own food system. In early 2007, in Sélingué, Mali, La Via Campesina held a Forum for Food Sovereignty, at which over 600 people gathered to debate, discuss and exchange ideas, experiences, seeds, and knowledge. The process produced concrete policy recommendations, covering everything from transnational corporations to the protection of the rights of indigenous people, pastoralists, fisherfolk and consumers, and in support of migrants (essential to the functioning of agriculture in Europe and the US, but largely ignored by the Bank).

These are robust and eminently possible policies, yet they turn Bank thinking on its head. Perhaps the clearest example of this is in the Bank’s enthusiasm to promote access to markets. The response of La Via Campesina, one of the world’s largest social movements comprised of poor farmers and landless people, is: ‘Access to markets? Yes! Access to our own markets’. They point to the fundamental inequalities that characterise the world food system, and argue in particular for tariff protection for small farmers, so that they might compete with their heavily subsidised developed-country counterparts.

The Bank, however, takes a dim view of subsidies.

As nonfarm incomes rise, pressures to address rural-urban income disparities through subsidies would compete for fiscal expenditures, at a high opportunity cost for public goods and rural basic needs. On the other hand, addressing those disparities through import protection would elevate food costs for the large masses of poor consumers who are net food buyers.

It is true that large numbers of poor people are net food buyers. But the Bank is reluctant to address their food poverty by direct income transfers – a mechanism used successfully in developed countries. They also shy away from considering the dynamic system effects of agricultural protection: tariff barriers aren’t only economic ends in themselves, but they provide a shield behind which other kinds of policies, and more profound comprehensive agrarian reform, can take place. In siding with the status quo, the Bank aligns itself with richer farmers, against poorer ones and landless people.

CONCLUSION

The report’s authors are right – the future of smallholders need not be bleak. But following the Bank’s policy trajectory is more likely than not to leave the world worse off. The Bank isn’t an organisation geared to agricultural development – its history points to its widespread failure, and it dogmatic policy flies in the face of available evidence about best practices in international development. The outdated modernisation paradigm assuming that large-scale commercial farming was always and everywhere more efficient than smallholder agriculture has proved a poor guide for development policy. Rather than recycle the Bank’s past failures, radical new directions are needed.

ActionAid’s HungerFree campaign supports the call by Via Campesina, the world’s largest movement of smallholders and peasants, for a shift to more socially-owned system of policy formulation, and a new model of agricultural policy guided by the objective of achieving the right to food. Under this vision, agricultural policy wouldn’t be a plan unilaterally formulated and imposed from above, but the result of participation of farmers and consumers. Potential reforms would be assessed through a right to food lens (as defined in the UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food) according to whether they would strengthen or weaken local food systems, and...
enhance or undermine people’s ability to claim their right to food or access productive resources. In this vision, central priorities for policymakers would be:

- How the state can spearhead agrarian reforms that will reverse the trend of consolidating land in the hands of the few, strengthen small-scale and especially female producers, and revitalize rural communities, on the lines agreed at the United Nations International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) in 2006.
- How to break monopolies and oligopolies in the food system, with special attention to the regulation of supermarkets and other agribusinesses.
- How to stabilise commodity prices, including through selective use of floor price mechanisms and exploration of domestic or international supply management systems.
- How to protect sensitive domestic agricultural sub-sectors and infant agro-processing industries through tariffs and other instruments.
- How to reform agricultural markets so as to strengthen cooperative and producer groups and the position of women as producers and wage earners.

In addition, ActionAid and others believe that a paradigm for revitalising agriculture in the interests of the poor would also need to pay attention to:

- How to eliminate discrimination against women in access to and control over land, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Community-based and customary law should be respected but should not be used to deprive women of land rights.
- How to hold companies, including agribusiness corporations, accountable nationally and internationally for the impact of their activities on human rights.
- How to scale up successful agro-ecology and sustainable farming approaches, including low-input ‘social technologies’, which build on small innovations and community management.
- How to foster major new investment in R&D and rural extension of a kind that empowers women, indigenous people and poor and marginalised communities, reinforces their rights, assures their participation in designing research agendas and enhances local food security and biodiversity.
- How to accomplish a fundamental democratisation of the decision-making, policy—setting and implementation processes of the World Bank and other international financial institutions, in order to give a fairer voice to the demands and priorities of poor and excluded peoples and states.

The most important step towards an agricultural paradigm that puts poor and hungry people first is what Via Campesina has called a democratic debate about food. For most of the developing world, that debate has never happened. If developing country governments continue to take their policy cues from the Bank, it never will.

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